Newsletter of the African Union (AU) and the Horn of Africa (HOA) from June 1st to August 31st 2017

This bulletin deals with African issues of peace and security through the decisions and resolutions of the African Union (mainly by its Peace and Security Council) and those of the United Nations. He also discusses security issues through the international press.

(June 1 to August 31, 2017)

Online Productions

  • The Horn of Africa – Political and security developments (Link) – 2015
  • HOA Newsletter 1, HOA2, HOA3, HOA4, HOA5, HOA6, HOA7 (Link)
  • “IGAD: a solution for the future?” – August 2015 (Link)
  • “The January 2016 African Union Summit: Let’s talk little but let’s talk about it!” (Link)
  • “The Ugandan Interference in South Sudan” – August 2016 – Patrick FERRAS and Julie SACHE (Link and Link)
  • “Ethiopia: weak signals accumulate”, October 6, 2016 (Link)
  • “Ethiopian National Defense Forces to maneuver” – June 2017

 

INTRODUCTION

Peacekeeping missions will have to adapt to a significant drop in their budget. The United States has decided to reduce its contribution and it has therefore been necessary to save money. Some senior UN officials have spoken of adapting the system in the light of recent events or actions taken since the deployment of the troops. Let’s not be fooled, it took and will be necessary in the next two years pass the budget cuts on the mandate and staff. It is enough to read carefully the reports of the great peacekeeping operations and the reports of the groups of experts not to see the same optimism as in New York. Only one peacekeeping operation ended this year. UNOCI was withdrawn from the continent on 30 June 2017. As part of the African-led operations, only the ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau (ECOMIB) has halted its activities.

In line with US announcements, the G5 Sahel Joint Force Resolution was passed without UN financial support. French diplomacy could not bend the United States on this sensitive subject. The French President’s trip to Bamako in early July left a bitter taste to the G5’s African leaders.

The African Union summit in Addis Ababa has not resulted in major decisions.

The reform of this institution remains stammering.

After analyzing these two topics, we will return to the main events of peace and security in Africa through the international press, decisions and resolutions of the United Nations and the African Union.

 

1 QUARTER RECORDS

The African Union Summit

The African Union Summit was held in Addis Ababa from June 27 to July 4, 2017. Observers from the pan-African institution believed that a number of steps could be taken on AU reform. Little concrete progress has been made. The two texts below (Institute of Security Studies of Addis Ababa) present a good summary of the conference of Heads of State and Government and the reflections in progress.

The 29th African Union (AU) Summit from 27 June to 4 July 2017 in Addis Ababa was supposed to be critical in charting the organisation’s way forward, following the groundbreaking decisions on AU financing and reform adopted in the past 12 months. There is, however, still little clarity on the implementation of these decisions. During the 27th AU summit in Kigali in July 2016, the heads of state and government adopted a new funding mechanism – proposed by the AU High Representative for the Peace Fund, Donald Kaberuka – based on a 0.2% levy on non-African imports.bIn January 2017 the heads of state had also agreed to the institutional reforms proposed by Rwandan President Paul Kagame in five areas: focusing on key priorities; realigning AU institutions in order to deliver on those priorities; connecting the AU to its citizens; managing the business of the AU efficiently and effectively at both the political and the operational level; and financing the AU sustainably and with the full ownership of member states. In the AU Assembly’s final decision of January 2017, the scope, the reform timeline and the oversight mechanisms were still to be determined. The recent summit was supposed to shed light on these aspects.

However, the 29th summit did not come up with a clear vision of the way forward.

Deadlines for implementation pushed back

 The progress report presented by Kagame to his fellow heads of state and government at the summit postponed the full implementation of the Kigali decision on funding to 2019 instead of 2018 – a sign that these decisions are not as easy to put in place as was initially thought. Meanwhile, the summit adopted a budget of US$ 769 million for the 2018 financial year, based on the current system. The progress report Kagame presented does, however, propose an oversight mechanism and identify recommendations to be put in place by January 2019, which is the deadline set by the ambitious implementation matrix. According to this matrix, the following recommendations are among those to be implemented by January 2018: the establishment of a troika of AU chairpersons; a review of the framework of partnership summits; the holding of only one ordinary AU summit in January every year, with the July summit to be a coordinating meeting with regional economic communities (RECs); and new mechanisms to impose sanctions and ensure implementation. In the medium term – i.e., by July 2018 – the critical issue of division of labour between the AU and RECs should be clarified. As the various documents on the relations between the AU and RECs vacillate between a vertical structure – emphasising the primacy of the continental organisation – and the principle of subsidiarity – giving the primary role to RECs – such a clarification would determine the fate of other recommendations, such as the proposed structure of the AU Commission.

Criticism emerges over the methodology of reform

While there seems to be consensus on the necessity for reforms, many criticisms arose from member states from the southern, northern and eastern regions regarding the methodology. This methodology – used in July 2016 and January 2017 – consists of presenting reports directly to heads of  state and government, instead of first going through the Executive Council, which consists of foreign ministers. Critics argued that this does not leave enough time for heads of state and their delegations to fully consider the reports. They also pointed out that it bypasses the legal channels of decision-making set out in the AU Constitutive Act (the specialised technical committees, Permanent Representative Committee, and Executive Council). In addition, it should be noted that none of the regional powers seems to champion the initiatives on funding and reform, leaving the leaders of small states in charge of shepherding these efforts.

 

Implementation of some recommendations raises questions

On the substance of the reform, many recommendations face challenges regarding their implementation. The new funding mechanism’s compliance with the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) rules is a source of concern for many member states and their international partners. As 48 member states are party to the Marrakech Agreement creating the WTO, clarification on this matter would shape the sustainability of the import levy. The establishment of a troika consisting of the last chairperson, the current chairperson and the upcoming chair would also, for example, require a modification of the Constitutive Act. Clarification is needed on the role of the assembly bureau, elected at the same time as the AU chair. Does the establishment of the troika mean that the AU will have a triennial work plan? Over and above the establishment of the troika, how can coherence and continuity from one chair to another be ensured? In addition, strengthening the role of the chairperson would also call for a clear division of labour between the AU chairperson and the chairperson of the AU Commission to avoid any overlap or competition. From the same perspective, the establishment of a reform implementation unit in the office of the chairperson also poses the risk of overlap with the deputy chairperson, who is officially in charge of the commission’s administration and financing. The difficulties with the reforms are illustrated by the fact that several bold propositions contained in the initial report on reforms have fallen by  the wayside. For example, the recommendation to limit the role of the Permanent Representative Committee (AU ambassadors in Addis Ababa) to a channel of communication between the AU Commission and the capitals – instead of an oversight body – no longer figures strongly. Another feature of the initial Kagame report – ‘focus[ing] the AU on fewer priorities’ – has not been allocated a deadline. After the euphoria in January, this shows the fragility of consensus among heads of state on the reforms.

Instead of delivering a package of reforms, the 29th summit rather revealed that the reform process remains the subject of discussion, debate and even disagreement among member states. It remains to be seen whether the diverging views can be reconciled in order to achieve a real consensus.

 

Options to restructure the AU to ensure greater peace and security (ISS du 22 août 2017)

The current reform process in the African Union (AU) is aimed at improving the effectiveness of the organisation. Among others, the current configuration of the departments of peace and security and of political affairs leads to much confusion. Three restructuring options could be considered: maintaining the status quo while clarifying mandates, in order to enhance coherence; merging the two departments; or creating a new structure with a strategic and an operational arm, similar to that of some development agencies.

In future, the AU will ‘focus on key priorities: political affairs; peace and security; economic integration and Africa’s voice on the international scene’. That is, if the AU reforms proposed by Rwandan President Paul Kagame and adopted by heads of state in January 2017 are implemented.

Six months down the line, however, there is still no clear indication on how this critical provision of Kagame’s report, which deals with priorities, will affect the bureaucratic organisation of the AU Commission (AUC), especially when it comes to peace and security.

The institutional structure of the AUC matters because it shapes the AU’s response to emerging and current conflicts. So far, the AU has struggled to comprehensively address both the triggers and the roots of conflicts in Africa. Some countries relapse into conflict after a period of peace (Mozambique, Burundi) while there is no end in sight for others (Sudan, Somalia, South Sudan).

A crucial question is where to draw the line between political affairs and peace and security, in light of these various complex situations. Should the AU focus on putting out the fires and curbing conflict? Or should it be giving political direction and monitoring compliance with the principles of good governance? And which department should do what in these two areas?

 

Current structures: opportunities and flaws

Currently, the AU has a Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and a Peace and Security Department (PSD). According to the statute of the AUC, the PSD covers ‘conflict prevention, management and resolution, and combating terrorism’. The portfolio of the DPA covers various themes such as human rights, democracy, good governance, electoral observation, free movement of people, the reform of the United Nations (UN) Security Council, humanitarian affairs, refugees and internally displaced persons.

At first sight, there does not seem to be any overlap, as the portfolio of the DPA consists mainly of thematic areas of intervention while that of the PSD mainly covers tasks. The mandates seem complementary in the sense that conflict prevention and management (PSD) can only be effective if issues such as human rights and election management – the causes of instability – are addressed (DPA).

From this perspective, the PSD provides a short-term response to instability while the DPA addresses the structural issues. Yet it is not as simple as that. For example, both electoral observation and humanitarian affairs, which are located in the DPA, imply short-term responses to pressing challenges. Meanwhile, Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) as well as the AU Border Program, both located in the PSD, have ‘structural’ overtones.

 

The need for a comprehensive approach

Many argue that the distinction between peace and security and political affairs is artificial, and thus limits the ability of the AU to provide a comprehensive and effective response to instability. This addresses a general concern about the collaboration between the two departments, which many observers agree could be improved.

Despite efforts to create institutional linkages – such as interdepartmental task forces on conflict prevention or PCRD – most of the collaboration between the departments depends on the relations between the principals.

In addition, there has been limited reflection on how to enhance synergy between the departments, which is currently limited to a few areas such as electoral observation. For example, the links between the African Governance Architecture (in the DPA) and the African Peace and Security Architecture (in the PSD) have still not been defined, despite the fact that most stakeholders in the AU view it as a necessity.

 

Two departments: a continental exception not the rule

The question can therefore be asked whether this division should be maintained.

At the continental level, the AUC is an exception in this regard. In most regional economic communities (RECs), peace and security and political affairs form part of a single portfolio.

 

Organisation Departments Divisions
Economic Community West African States Political Affairs and Peace and Security
  • Early Warning
  • Political Affairs
  • Peacekeeping  and   Regional Security
Economic Community Central African States Human Integration, Peace and Security
  • Elections            and          Good Governance
  • Justice and Human Rights
  • Fight Against Crime
  • Free Movement
  • Preventive       Diplomacy       and Mediation
  • Early Warning Mechanism in Central Africa
East African Community Cooperation in Political Matters
  • Political Affairs
  • International Affairs
  • Peace and Security
Southern African Development Community Organ on Politics, Defence and Security
  • Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre
  • Defence Affairs and Planning
  • Politics and Diplomacy
  • Peace Building
  • Disaster Risk Reduction
  • Police
  • Public Security

 

Yet one could argue that even though this configuration makes sense at the level of RECs, it does not at the continental level, where the stakes are higher and there are more activities that cannot be properly managed in a single department.

 

Twinning with the UN Secretariat in name only

The structure of the AUC is aligned to the division of labour practised in the UN Secretariat, which has both a Department of Political Affairs and a Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

However, a closer look reveals that the similarity between the AUC and the UN Secretariat is superficial. In New York, the Department of Political Affairs deals with areas that are part of the portfolio of the PSD in Addis Ababa, such as preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention and mediation. The only common area of intervention between the UN Department of Political Affairs and the AU DPA is election observation. In the UN system, governance – and especially support to election management bodies or constitutionalism – is mainly dealt with by the UN Development Programme.

What could then be done? To answer this question, several issues need to be taken into account, including the division of labour between the AU and the RECs; the inclusion of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development in the AUC; and the establishment of a sustainable and predictable funding mechanism.

There are three possible solutions: maintaining the status quo while clarifying mandates, merging the two departments, or establishing new structures.

 

Maintaining the status quo

One option would be to keep the current division while clarifying and streamlining the mandate of each department. For example, in the case of the DPA, there should be clarity on whether its mandate is about technical assistance to member states in the broad area of governance, or if it should be about norm producing, monitoring and evaluating the compliance of member states. If the division remains, the portfolios of the DPA and PSD could also be aligned with the current divisions in the UN, as outlined above.

 

Merging the two departments for a comprehensive approach

A merger would represent a logical step in the current context of reform, which includes a call to reduce the number of departments. This option would demonstrate the AU’s commitment to a comprehensive approach to instability, by simultaneously addressing the root causes of conflict and reacting to the triggers of crises. It would also align AUC structures with the configuration of most RECs, and thus facilitate collaboration and coordination between them.

The initial Kagame report on reforms stressed the need to reduce the size of the commission and the number of specialised technical agencies, which could leave the door open for an overhaul of the current structure of the AUC with its eight departments.

However, many risks are associated with this option. The first would be in terms of managing this new department, which would likely be the biggest in the AUC and get most of the AU’s budget and external support.

Second, as the PSD already has more staff and resources than the DPA, there is the risk that the merger would result in security or short-term elements carrying more weight than governance or a long-term approach. A serious effort would be needed to balance these two approaches.

 

Separating the strategic and operational levels

Another option would be to establish an activity-based division similar to what is used in many development agencies. It would separate the strategic and operation levels of the AU’s work in the field of peace and security.

There would be a ‘department of political affairs’ in charge of policy definition, political dialogue, monitoring and evaluation, while a separate ‘department of operations’ would be in charge of implementation, meaning the deployment of various instruments (electoral observation missions; mediation and preventive diplomacy; peace-support operations; humanitarian assistance).

The advantage of such cooperation would be to ensure that policy or strategy is always the linchpin of the AU’s activities in peace and security and governance. This option would also force the AU to define strategies and policies with clear operational roadmaps.

The challenge would be to ensure that operations do not take over policy, as, for example, with peace-support operations defining the policy strategy instead of being just a tool. The UN illustrates how difficult this is, with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations often taking on a more significant role than the Department of Political Affairs in crisis situations. Avoiding such a situation would require the AUC leadership to exercise strong and coherent control over these departments.

 

Political will and sustainable funding also critical elements

Regardless of the scenario chosen by the AU, an institutional overhaul is only part of the broader issue. Crucial to the effectiveness of the AU’s response to instability is the political will of member states to implement the so-called continental shared values. In this regard, an effective bureaucratic organisation requires the coherent alignment of many elements: an optimal institutional structure within the AUC; a sustainable funding mechanism; a shared political commitment; and a clear and coherent division of labour between the AU and RECs.

Having the most effective structure possible  in place would help to guarantee that the political will of member states, if this exists, has the optimal impact on the ground. This means that conflict management and prevention need to address both cyclical and structural causes to avoid relapse. If the AU must ‘silence the guns by 2020’, a decision on this matter should be taken speedily, as the clock is ticking.

 

Joint G5 Sahel Force (FC-G5S)

Paris wanted to support the deployment of the so-called G5 Sahel African counter-terrorism force (Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad) through a UN Security Council resolution that would provide it with political support and a legal basis. The Americans and the British thought that a simple declaration by the Council would suffice. The bone of contention is the financing of this force, which could cost up to $ 400 million a year (more than 350 million euros), according to the Malian parties. The European Union (EU) pledged, on Monday, 5 June, to put 50 million euros on the table to equip the 5,000 soldiers, police and civilians who should be deployed later this year in areas border crossings between Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Mauritania. But these countries, which are among the poorest in the world, hope for additional financial support from their allies.

But the United States requires the United Nations to save up to a billion dollars on its peacekeeping operations (whose total budget amounts to nearly $ 8 billion). They therefore refused to endorse a resolution with UN funding. The lack of realism of French foreign policy was to believe as for the Paris Agreement that the United States would go back on their intentions! The resolution is very clear (2359 of 21 June 2017): “It is up to the G5 Sahel states to give the CF-G5S the resources it needs”. The French president’s trip to Bamako at the G5 Summit, the official launch of the Joint Force, was not accompanied by the desired funding. On the other hand, the US willingness to reduce the budget of peacekeeping operations is already noticeable in the missions in the DRC and Darfur where the numbers have been revised downwards. The United Nations, however, camouflaged this setback with surprising explanations such as changes in modus operandi or a situation that is improving …

The disengagement of Barkhane or a reflection on the desirability of such a device does not seem to be on the agenda.

 

Gulf crisis revives tensions between Eritrea and Djibouti (Romain HOUEIX – 19/06/2017)

Qatari troops have left Ras Doumeira, a border region disputed by Eritrea and Djibouti. This departure, decided by Doha following the crisis with Saudi Arabia, causes a worrying resurgence of tensions between the two countries. The diplomatic crisis between Qatar and the Gulf countries has repercussions on its neighbors in the Horn of Africa. The states of Djibouti and Eritrea are on the verge of conflict due to the departure of Qatari mediation troops in the Cape Doumeira region, on the border between the two countries. Djibouti claims that Eritrea took advantage of the withdrawal of the contingent to occupy the disputed territory of Ras Doumeira. At the request of the Ethiopian neighbor, the UN Security Council will hold consultations on the dispute Monday (June 19th) in New York.

Asmara, for its part, did not react directly to these accusations and indicated that the Eritrean government would not comment on “the information – factual and speculative – produced in recent days”. At the same time, the chairman of the African Union (AU) commission, Moussa Faki Mahamat, called the two countries to “calm and restraint” and announced the sending of a mission to establish facts. Qatar intervened between the two countries of the Horn of Africa in June 2008, after a four-day armed conflict over the control of Ras Doumeira, a strategic promontory at the entrance to the Red Sea. Eritrea and Djibouti then pledged to resolve their territorial dispute under the mediation of Doha. The Qataris were to remain deployed in the disputed zone until the final agreement.

A “unilateral” withdrawal

This balance has shattered. On June 14, the Qatari Foreign Ministry reported that “the State of Qatar has informed the government of Djibouti of the withdrawal of all its troops deployed on the border with Eritrea”.

A decision that follows the diplomatic crisis that erupted between Doha and Saudi Arabia – followed by several Gulf countries – which accuses Qatar of “supporting Islamist terrorism.” Djibouti, like Eritrea, with good relations with Saudi Arabia and its allies in the United Arab Emirates, both chose their side. Djibouti today blames Qatar for acting “unilaterally and without consultation”.

Qatar, element of stability in the region

For Patrick Ferras, director of the Observatory of the Horn of Africa, the cries of ostracies of Djibouti constitute a “diplomatic hypocrisy”. “[Djibouti] was not very grateful for Qatar’s involvement for nine years in solving its border problem,” he recalls in a blog post that Djibouti may have been too quick to support Saudi Arabia. . “He notices it and tries to catch the eyes of the world on a possible resumption of the conflict with Asmara,” he continues. “Qataris are involved on several grounds outside their territory,” says 24 H.A. Hellyer, a specialist in contemporary Arab history and a member of the Atlantic Council think tank. In its search for international visibility, Qatar has multiplied mediations in the Horn of Africa: Darfur, Sudan … and the Djibouti-Eritrean border. “Many countries that put pressure on Qatar are also involved in the region,” said the analyst. “There are probably several other areas in the same situation as Djibouti and Eritrea.If the crisis in the Gulf continues, this type of disruption will multiply.”

Djibouti wants the UN Security Council to order Eritrea to withdraw. Otherwise, climbing can not be ruled out. Djibouti’s Foreign Minister Mahmoud Ali Youssouf warned on Thursday: “If Eritrea persists in its search for military solutions, Djibouti is ready for this eventuality.” Moreover, as pointed out by RFI, the context is different from that of 2008. In 2016, the Djiboutian and Ethiopian governments signed a defense agreement. By the cogency of alliances, Ethiopia, hereditary enemy of Eritrea, could therefore react in case of attack against Djibouti, and cause a new blaze of the Horn of Africa.

 

2 AFRICAN NEWS

2.1 NEWS

South Sudan (June 4, 2017)

An agreement was signed in Kampala between the South Sudanese government of Salva Kiir and representatives of the rebellion, the SPLA / IO of Riek Machar. The agreement concerns the state of Yei, theater of bloody fighting for months. Although this initiative marks the beginning of a reconciliation, important issues remain unresolved.

Africa – Israel (June 2017)

Rwanda, Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia: Four African countries visited last year by Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu. At the same time, the Hebrew State renewed diplomatic relations with Guinea-Conakry. This Sunday, Benyamin Netanyahu is in Liberia and next October, it is in Togo that an Africa-Israel Summit is announced. Beyond cooperation in the fields of security, infrastructure and agriculture, it is above all a diplomatic breakthrough that the Jewish state is seeking in Africa. Israeli leaders dream of weakening what they call the “automatic majority” of countries voting against Israel at the UN or in other international forums. Trying to move the lines, the Jewish State talks with African Muslim countries: Nigeria, Senegal. And we even mention more discreet contacts with countries in the Sahel. Efforts with fragile results. Last December, Senegal, a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, was one of 14 countries to vote for a resolution condemning the colonization of the Palestinian territories, which led to Israel’s announcement of the suspension of cooperation programs with the United Nations. the Senegal. Since then, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Senegalese President Macky Sall have announced on the sidelines of a West African summit a normalization of their relations. In addition, “Senegal will support Israel’s candidacy as an observer to the African Union” (AU), according to Israeli government services.

European Union – Sahel (June 2017)

The head of diplomacy of the European Union, Federica Mogherini, announced in Bamako an aid of 50 million euros to allow the G5 Sahel countries (Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Chad) to create a joint force designed to fight against the jihadist threat. At the G7 summit in Italy at the end of May, Niger’s President Mahamadou Issoufou called on the major powers and the UN to “provide the necessary means” for the joint G5 Sahel force. “The heads of state of the G5 Sahel who met in Ryad just a few weeks ago decided to bring these 5,000 men to 10,000 men, this really shows their commitment because it is a space that is very vast “, said Malian Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdoulaye Diop during the meeting. According to the statement, the participants welcomed the decision adopted at the last summit of the organization, on February 6 in Bamako, of “immediate creation of the joint G5 Sahel force whose regional mandate is to fight against terrorism, transnational crime. The initial decision to create this “joint force dates back to the G5 Sahel summit” on 20 November 2015 in N’Djamena, the Chadian capital.

Cameroun – MNJTF (June 2017)

Thirty Cameroonian soldiers engaged in the fight against Islamist insurgents Boko Haram were arrested after demonstrating for the payment of their premiums and their relief, announced the Ministry of Defense. These Cameroonian soldiers of the Joint Multinational Force, tasked with fighting Boko Haram, “undertook (Sunday, 4 June) to stop barricading on National Highway No. 1 in the town of Zigue (Extreme- north), “said the Ministry of Defense in a statement read on the antennas of state radio. The soldiers in question called for “their immediate relief”, as well as “the payment of their bonuses for ‘international soldiers’ … like those served to their comrades in UN peacekeeping operations,” the statement said. According to the Ministry of Defense, military personnel serving under the banner of the Multinational Joint Force (MNF), a regional coalition fighting Boko Haram, do not receive bonuses similar to those of troops operating on UN missions.

ECOWAS (June 2017)

ECOWAS member countries have decided to extend the mandate of the force deployed in The Gambia by one year. The Micega, mostly made up of Senegalese soldiers, nevertheless faces the hostility of some Gambians. In Monrovia, West African heads of state first praised “the crucial role” played by Micega “in the stabilization and security of The Gambia”.

Guinea-Bissau (June 5, 2017)

A first contingent of 65 men from the West African force deployed in Guinea-Bissau (Ecomib) left Bissau, Sunday, June 4, at the end of the day, for Lagos. This first group is essentially made up of Nigerian soldiers. It is also the first rotation of a withdrawal plan that will end on June 30, according to a source close to the Ecomib command. The Ecomib, having reached up to 600 men, currently has about 500 police, gendarmes or soldiers, mainly Nigerians, Senegalese and Burkinabes. The announcement of their withdrawal raises fears in some circles in Bissau where the political crisis persists despite several mediation initiatives.

Africa – Gulf Countries (June 2017)

The diplomatic crisis around Qatar has spread to Africa. After the break-up of Saudi diplomatic relations with the emirate, several countries of the continent have, in turn, taken a stand. Initially Mauritania, then the Comoros broke off diplomatic relations with Doha. Nouakchott accuses Qatar of “supporting terrorist organizations, spreading extremist ideas and sowing anarchy”. Then, it is the Senegalese government, in solidarity with Saudi Arabia, who recalled his ambassador to Qatar. A strong gesture that does not break all ties with the Qataris. Dakar says he wants to consult his diplomat on the follow-up to this crisis. In the same spirit, Djibouti decided to reduce its diplomatic representation in the emirate. An understandable prudence since Qatar is the mediator of the territorial conflict which opposes it with Eritrea. As for Gabon, the country supports the decision of Saudi Arabia and condemns “the recurrent actions of Qatar in favor of terrorism”. Libreville invites Doha to comply with international agreements on counter-terrorism. Finally, in East Africa, Khartoum regrets the decision of the “five Arab brother countries”. Sudan, like Somalia, calls for dialogue. The two states also offer their help for mediation to “protect the interests of Arab countries and peoples”.

West Africa (June 2017)

The countries of West and Central Africa want to strengthen their collaboration in the fight against piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. First step: a fundraiser. Faced with the resurgence of acts of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea (+ 76% in 2016), countries in West and Central Africa are trying to organize themselves. A donor conference is scheduled to be held in Yaoundé in late September or early October, under the auspices of the Interregional Coordination Center (ICC) and Paul Biya, the Cameroonian President. Objective: to raise 50 million euros to improve the regional strategy. For Christian Trimua, former Togolese Secretary of State for Relations with Institutions, appointed head of CIC in late February, “the tensions in the Niger Delta region, poverty and the rise of terrorism are the main causes of recrudescence attacks “. Fighting piracy in such a vast area requires enormous resources. If the grid of the territory began with the reinforcement of zones of defense (Cape Verde, Angola and Congo) and the deployment, two weeks ago, of four patrollers Cameroonian between Malabo, Pointe-Noire, Calabar and Libreville, “fight against Piracy in such a vast area requires enormous resources, “he concludes.

Djibouti – Eritrea – Qatar (June 14, 2017)

Qatar, embroiled in a crisis with its neighbors, announced the withdrawal of its observation force deployed in 2010 between Eritrea and Djibouti in order to prevent a conflict between the two African countries degenerate. In a statement, the Foreign Ministry said that “the State of Qatar has informed the government of Djibouti of the withdrawal of all its troops deployed on the border with Eritrea”. He said Qatar has been a “neutral mediator” in this region of Africa. Qatar did not specify how many soldiers this force is formed. This withdrawal comes in full crisis between Qatar and its neighbors, many of whom have broken with this wealthy little gas emirate of the Gulf accusing it of supporting the “terrorism”. Although a military escalation of the crisis has been averted, tension remains strong in the region. It follows a stance taken by Eritrea, which has supported Saudi Arabia and its allies in the dispute with Qatar. An old territorial dispute opposes Eritrea to Djibouti, which led to fighting in 2010 at the border.

UN – Africa (15 June 2017)

The Security Council has considered the report of the Secretary-General on the modalities envisaged for the authorization process for African Union (AU) peace operations and the provision of United Nations support for such operations, including the financial plan. The need to frame this co-operation in order to make better use of it was emphasized by the members of the Council who have testified to the growing interest of the international community for an effective partnership between these two organizations. This partnership, which has evolved over the years, has become an essential part of the response to the common challenges posed by armed conflict in Africa, noted speakers who made introductory presentations to the session. Secretary-General Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti, Secretary-General of the African Union for Peace and Security, Smaïl Chergui, and African Union High Representative for the African Fund for Peace Donald Kaberuka. Indeed, “the international community must be able to respond adequately and creatively to security contexts around the world,” said Ribeiro Viotti, introducing the report of the Secretary-General. She explained that the report, which proposes a “joint process of planning and mandating AU-led peace support operations authorized by the Security Council”, is the result of six months of coordination and cooperation between the Secretariat and the Commission of the African Union. On 19 April, she said, the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission had already signed the UN-AU Joint Framework for a Strengthened Partnership on Peace and Security at the first annual UN-AU Conference. “This framework speaks volumes about the willingness to address the threats to peace and security on the continent,” said the representative of Ethiopia, who also spoke on behalf of Egypt. of Senegal. In addition to the use of trust funds funded by voluntary contributions, the Secretary-General has identified four possible ways to use the contributions of its Member States to help meet the needs of AU peace operations, stressing that there was no single option suitable for all situations. It would be a question of providing grants in the event of exceptional circumstances or emergency situations; to jointly finance a jointly developed budget; to create an ad hoc United Nations support office; or to jointly finance a hybrid mission. “A well-funded African peace architecture is not only a priority for Africa, but also a global common good,” said the African Union High Representative for the African Peace Fund, after making Proposals on the procedure for submitting AU peace operations to the Security Council for approval, when support funded by the contributions of UN Member States is requested for these operations. Mr. Kaberuka took the opportunity to explain the structure of the African Peace Fund, which focuses on three areas: mediation and preventive diplomacy; institutional capacities; and peace support operations. The fund has already received contributions from 14 AU Member States in the amount of $ 65 million, or 12 percent of the target.

Mali (June 16, 2017)

Nearly two years after the signing of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, and as the transitional period draws to a close, in June, Mali is again at a turning point, explained to the Security Council the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for that country, Mahamat Saleh Annadif. He referred to the significant progress made in implementing the interim measures in the Agreement on Policy and Security. Nevertheless, this progress is not yet irreversible, as insecurity is spreading in the country and beyond its borders, he warned. “The various operational coordination mechanisms and joint patrols are on track”, he continued, while the process of security sector reform, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration continues, even though the pace is slow. These are, according to Mr. Annadif, “so many positive developments that add to the institutional and political reforms that are to the credit of the government.” However, he warned, these positive developments risk being annihilated by the tension that has existed for some time between the Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA) and the Platform, which has turned into a conflict. Community. According to the Special Representative, “a strong warning deserves to be addressed to the military and political leaders of these two movements to put an end once and for all to killings of innocent and disarmed populations”. For its part, MINUSMA, the only presence in these regions, is doing its utmost to protect these populations while using its good offices to stop the conflict. These practices unfortunately make the bed of terrorists and other extremists who reinforce each other, both in their mode of operation and in the sophistication of the equipment used, reported

  1. Annadif. More seriously, they extend their areas of action and their influence. The Mission therefore aims to strengthen its presence in the central region, he said, as part of an integrated and multidimensional approach in partnership with other actors such as the European Union. The planned early deployment of the rapid reaction force is part of this scheme. In addition, thanks to the robust mandate that the Security Council gave to MINUSMA through resolution 2295 (2016), “we have readjusted our rules of engagement,” said Annadif, explaining that MINUSMA has been able to step up its patrols and anticipate certain threats by conducting proactive and preventive operations for the protection of civilian populations and their personnel. The other innovation of this resolution, he noted, is the support that MINUSMA must provide to the Malian Defense and Security Forces (MSF), which must now be implemented. In addition, he saw the strengthening of the passive and active security of MINUSMA facilities and field operations “as a sine qua non for the Mission to assume its responsibilities”. The lack of a convoy escort battalion, as well as the lack of attack and transport helicopters, is a major handicap, he says.

DRC (June 16, 2017)

During a five-day visit to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) this week, UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Pierre Lacroix traveled to the Kasai region and other countries. expressed concern about the violence there. He went on Wednesday to Kananga, the capital of Kasai province, to express the solidarity of the United Nations with the inhabitants of the region and discuss ongoing efforts to strengthen the presence of the United Nations Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO ) In the region.

Côte d’Ivoire (June 19, 2017)

The DDR process has been completed since June 2015, but the objective of this meeting in New York is to study the Ivorian example, to know if it can be applied to other countries of the subregion, as in Mali. Since the end of the post-electoral crisis, according to the United Nations, the disarmament and demobilization rate is 92% in Côte d’Ivoire. “The country is rid of mines and other improvised explosive devices,” announced the defense minister last April. However, “it is urgent that the government improve the discipline within the armed forces,” says Aichatou Mindaoudou, the UN Special Representative in IC. While the last UN peacekeepers left the Ivorian soil in February and this UN mission will finally close on June 30, former rebels, reinstated in the army, rose in May for the 4th times in 3 years. For their part, the 6,800 demobilized former soldiers of cell 39 say, through the voice of one of their spokesmen, that they have been forgotten by the demobilization, disarmament and reintegration program.

CAR (June 2017)

A peace agreement providing for an “immediate” ceasefire was signed in Rome under the aegis of the Catholic community of Sant’Egidio, between the Central African government and 14 armed groups. In particular, the parties committed themselves to an immediate ceasefire throughout the Central African Republic, “under the control of the international community”, according to the text of this agreement, made public at the Roman seat of this community, very involved in peace mediations, especially in Africa. The community of Sant’Egidio played a key role in negotiating a peace agreement in Mozambique. She is also involved in mediations in South Sudan, Libya, and Casamance in southern Senegal.

Congo – CAR (June 20, 2017)

The UN has decided to dismiss the Congolese battalion of Minusca. About 600 soldiers of the battalion operating in Berberati are accused of sexual assault. This decision comes after a damning report by an official of the UN mission in the Central African Republic (Minusca), who had threatened to repatriate these soldiers if nothing was done within the target battalion, these soldiers are also suspected of trafficking fuel and lack of discipline. Senegalese general Balla Keita had already sent six letters of “blame” this year to the commander of the group in question. In 2016, 120 soldiers of the same contingent were sent home following allegations of sexual assault on at least seven victims, including six children. But there has been “no progress in the behavior of the Congolese battalion,” said Keita. “The situation has deteriorated to the point where we can no longer trust this battalion because of its poor command, lack of discipline and operational deficiencies.”

Côte d’Ivoire (June 20, 2017)

Over the past three decades, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants have been key in preventing violence, stabilizing and supporting political processes, said Monday on behalf of the Secretary Secretary-General, the United Nations High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Izumi Nakamitsu. At a high-level roundtable at UN headquarters in New York, Nakamitsu stressed that DDR has become an integral part of peace operations around the world, highlighting the example of Côte d’Ivoire. Ivory. To be successful, DDR must be adapted to the overall policy framework in order to resolve the conflict. To be sustainable, account must be taken of competing security and stabilization operations, including security sector reforms and the long-term and multi-dimensional reintegration of ex-combatants. Political will at the highest level, adequate funding and consideration of the economic and social political grievances of ex-combatants are among the key elements for the success of DDR, said Thomas Kontogeorgos, head of the DDR operations section. peacekeeping, on behalf of the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations in the Rule of Law and Security Institutions, Alexander Zuev. “According to the integrated approach, reintegration lasts at least five years, so it is imperative to design multi-year programs with partners such as the World Bank from the start,” he concluded.

Somalia – Turkey (June 24, 2017)

Yusuf Garaad Omar, Somali Foreign Minister, said that the training camp conducted by Turkey in Somalia will be inaugurated in a few months. In a statement to Anadolu on the occasion of his visit to Ankara, Yusuf Garaad Omar said that “this camp will play an important role in the modernization of the Somali national army”. “This military training camp built in Somalia by our Turkish friends is of great importance and will be the first vocational training center for Somali soldiers,” Yusuf Garaad said. “Turkey has rehabilitated Mogadishu airport, built roads, hospitals and schools, confirming Ankara’s support for our country,” said Yusuf Garaad Omar, adding that “Bilateral cooperation between the two country is large, and that Turkey is an ideal partner for a better future for Somalia ”

Côte d’Ivoire (June 29, 2017)

United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres has welcomed the closure of the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) scheduled for 30 June 2017 after successfully completing his term.

Sudan – UN (June 30, 2017)

The UN Security Council endorsed a major reduction in the peacekeeping mission in Darfur (Minuad), following US pressure to cut some $ 600 million from the peacekeeping operations budget. The Council unanimously approved the British resolution proposing to reduce by at least 30% the number of military and police serving in UNAMID, a joint mission between the United Nations and the African Union.

Niger (July 4, 2017)

The Boko Haram sect has kidnapped 37 women and killed nine people in a village in southern Niger on Sunday, the Nigerian authorities said on Tuesday. Legal action is taken to try to find and release the captives.

Somalia – USA (July 15, 2017)

The United States is stepping up its action on the ground in Somalia against the extremist Shebab movement. A joint operation with the Somali army on July 2 – the second in less than a month – targeted a position of shebabs in the south of the country. Several American sources confirm this operation, which for the second time involved an American commando on the ground. The position targeted by the operation is located in Kunyo village in the south of the country, an area still under the control of jihadists. A position located near the city of Barawé, one of the strongholds of the armed group in southern Somalia. According to the US CBS, citing a Somali official, two helicopters initially struck. Then Somali and American soldiers were rushed to the ground. Some prisoners from a Shebab detention center were released. Mark Cheadle, a spokesman for US Africa Command, Africom, says US forces have been assisting and advising Somali soldiers without further details. The Pentagon has ordered Africom to intensify its raids against this extremist movement in Somalia, and US President Donald Trump has approved broader military operations against the Shebabs, suggesting that targeted operations in southern areas will intensify.

DRC (July 19, 2017)

As part of its change of operational mode, the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) will close five fixed bases in the territories of Walikale, Masisi and Lubero in North Kivu province as of July 31, announced the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for that country, Ms. Sidikou.

The new operational mechanism consists of giving priority to the mobility and flexibility of military interventions. It is in line with the strategy adopted by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. It includes long-distance patrols, presence demonstration patrols, aerial surveillance, and rapid deployment in the event of a security incident. Currently, MONUSCO can deploy, according to the mandate defined in resolution 2348 of March 2017, up to 16,215 military personnel, against 19,815 in the previous mandate.

South Sudan (July 20, 2017)

In response to renewed fighting in two regions of South Sudan, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations El Ghassim Wane on Thursday urged Security Council members to provide “active support” for the recent Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) initiative to organize a forum to revive the implementation of the 2015 peace agreement. The security environment “remains unstable” in South Sudan, where the need for “A” credible and sustainable ceasefire “is sorely felt, warned Mr. Wane. Since the announcement of a unilateral ceasefire by South Sudanese President Salva Kiir last June, he said, the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) has indeed reported a resumption of fighting in the Upper Nile and Equatoria regions, where the pro-government Sudan People’s Liberation Movement / Army (M / SPLA Government) would seek to take over territories from M / SPLA in the opposition.

Djibouti (July 2017)

China offers its services in the resolution of the border dispute between Djibouti and Eritrea. At the African Union forum Friday, the Chinese ambassador to the African Union suggested that China consider sending troops to the border between the two East African countries. A conflict that resurfaced after the Qatari troops, stationed since a ceasefire agreement in 2010 between Djibouti and Eritrea, withdrew from the conflict zones of Doumeira and Doumeira Island. At the African Union summit in early July, Djibouti sought arbitration by the pan-African institution and pleaded for a demarcation of the border after an “occupation” described as an act of war which he accused his Eritrean of war. On the question of arbitration, Kuang Weilin, the Chinese diplomat stressed that his country could also help mediation if ever the request was made to him, he told Associated Press. But this option may not convince all parties. Eritrea has assured that the only mediator in the crisis remains Qatar. China, an Asian giant, is expanding its military role in the world, in line with its diplomatic and economic offensive. This month, in particular, the country has installed in Djibouti, its first military base abroad, as France, the United States and Japan have already done. About 400 men are expected there. According to China, this base has only logistical and non-defense objectives. In particular, it should be used for UN anti-piracy, peacekeeping and humanitarian aid missions in Africa and West Asia.

Sudan (July 23, 2017)

About 47,000 Sudanese living in Saudi Arabia will return to their homeland in the coming days, the body of Sudanese expatriates said Saturday (33,000 Sudanese will return from Riyadh and 14,000 from Jeddah, 60% of whom are workers and artisans).

CAR (July 28, 2017)

UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Pierre Lacroix warned in a meeting with the Security Council on the Central African Republic (CAR) that the escalation of attacks on civilians and the peacekeepers may tip the situation in this country, which must be avoided “at all costs”. Mr. Lacroix was referring to the deteriorating security and humanitarian situation in Bangassou, in the south-east of the country, where three peacekeepers have been killed since last Sunday in an attack by self-defense groups affiliated with the country. anti-Balaka as they tried to secure access to water points for 2,000 displaced civilians, said the office of the spokesperson of the Secretary-General in a report of the meeting. During the meeting with the Security Council, the Deputy Secretary-General also expressed concern about the deteriorating security situation in the border town of Zemio, 290 km east of Bangassou, with the risk of renewed clashes. between the Muslim community and elements affiliated with the anti-Balaka, who had already led to the displacement of more than 22,000 civilians. He also mentioned that the security situation in the northern city of Bria remains fragile and that the departure of Ugandan and US forces from the eastern part of the country this spring has created a vacuum leading to emergence of hostile groups of “self-defense”.

Djibouti – China (August 2017)

China has inaugurated in Djibouti its first military base abroad, at the gates of the Red Sea, announced the agency China New. The opening of the base was marked by a ceremony attended by the Chinese navy’s number two, Tian Zhong, and the Djibouti Defense Minister, the official news agency reported. It will serve to support “naval escorts in Africa and the Middle East, peacekeeping operations (UN) and humanitarian aid,” said the Chinese Ministry of Defense last month, announcing the departure of a first group of soldiers bound for the African base. The base will also be used in Beijing to support anti-piracy operations and the evacuation of its nationals in the event of a crisis.

South Sudan (August 3, 2017)

At the end of his visit to South Sudan, UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Jean-Pierre Lacroix, stressed that the various initiatives that can bring peace to South Sudan are important, can be and that the United Nations is there to support them. “The fact that there are several initiatives under way is a good thing,” Lacroix told a press conference in Juba after his three-day mission to South Sudan. On the initiative of the IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development) Regional Group to revive the peace agreement signed in August 2015, the Under-Secretary-General welcomed “the countries of the region to actively engage the return of peace to South Sudan “. Regarding Uganda’s efforts to reunite the South Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) into two rival groups, Lacroix sees it as “an initiative at a different level but one that can also contribute to peace efforts “.

Deployment of the Regional Protection Force: UN Chief of Peacekeeping Operations Expects Improved and Enhanced Confidence in Juba and Other Parts of the Country with the Deployment of the Regional Protection Force , stressing that efforts are being made to speed up its deployment. Mr. Lacroix has announced that a Nepal unit and a part of an engineering unit from Bangladesh are already present in South Sudan. He also said that efforts are under way to speed up the arrival of a Rwandan battalion. “We are working very hard with other troop contributing countries such as Ethiopia and Kenya and others to see the deployment of units as soon as possible.” As I said, it’s a question hopefully if all goes well, but I think we are on the right track, “he said.

South Sudan (August 3, 2017)

South Sudan on Thursday resolved to change the name its army acquired during the liberation struggle days into a peoples’ defence force. The decision on army change of name was reached at the end of the sixth Command Council Conference of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), which ended with several resolutions. The command council conference was held at the army’s general headquarters, located north of the South Sudanese capital, Juba. Officially opened by President Salva Kiir, also the army commander in chief, the conference discussed issues relating to the restructuring and transformation of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). Held under the theme, “Restructuring for Effective Transformation” the conference passed several resolutions and recommendations, including changing the SPLA’s name to South Sudan People’s Defense Forces (SSPDF).

Ethiopia (August 4, 2017)

The Ethiopian Parliament, based in Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian capital, has taken the decision to lift the state of emergency on the basis of a report by Siraj Fegessa, the Ethiopian Minister of Defense, who said that stability Ethiopia had been sufficiently restored to justify the complete lifting of martial law.

Nigeria – USA (August 4, 2017)

The Trump administration is greenlighting a nearly $600 million sale of high-tech attack planes to Nigeria, officials said. The goal is to shore up the West African nation’s ability to fight Boko Haram and other extremists, despite U.S. concerns about human rights abuses by Nigerian security forces. The sale will let Nigeria buy up to 12 Embraer A-29 Super Tucano aircraft from Colorado-based Sierra Nevada Corp., according to officials who were briefed on the matter but spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss it publicly. The aircrafts come with sophisticated targeting equipment that the U.S says will help Nigeria fight terrorism, trafficking, insurgency and illicit trade. In his final days in office, former President Barack Obama put the planned sale on hold after a Nigerian fighter jet repeatedly bombed a camp near the Cameroon border housing civilians who had fled Boko Haram. Local officials have said more than 230 people were killed, in an incident that brought new attention to alleged abuses by Nigeria’s forces. Despite approving the sale to Nigeria, the U.S. is keeping up the pressure on Buhari’s government to improve its forces’ human rights practices and ensure accountability for violators, a U.S. official said. The aim of the sale is to help Nigeria and its neighbors strengthen their ability to fight Boko Haram and an Islamic State group affiliate in West Africa. Other countries in the region fighting similar threats already have the Super Tucano, the official noted. The State Department notified Congress late of its plans to approve the sale. That triggered a 30-day review period in which lawmakers can try to block the sale. While several Democrats in particular have raised concerns, Congress is unlikely to stop the administration from proceeding.

COMESA (August 7, 2017)

The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) Secretary-General Sindiso Ngwenya has called on Nairobi African states to meet the deadline to establish the continent’s largest trading bloc by the end of 2017. He told Xinhua in Nairobi that 21 of the 26 countries have so far signed an agreement to merge three regional blocs – COMESA, EAC and SADC. The formation of the Tripartite Free Trade Area by combining the East African Community (EAC), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and COMESA is proceeding as planned, said Mr. Ngwenya, visiting Nairobi as head of a COMESA election observation mission to monitor the August 8 presidential elections in Kenya. In addition, two other African states have also expressed interest in joining the economic bloc. “At the end of the year, Somalia and Tunisia will also join the tripartite free trade zone,” Ngwenya said. Now that stability has begun to return to Somalia, the Horn of Africa nation will become a member of COMESA again at the COMESA Summit of Heads of State and Government in October, he said. added. The future tripartite free trade area is to have 28 countries, covering an area of ​​about 18.3 million km2 and 61% of the population of the African continent.

South Sudan (August 8, 2017)

The Special Representative of the Secretary-General for South Sudan, David Shearer, on Tuesday welcomed the arrival of the first contingents of the UN’s Regional Protection Force (RPF) mandated by the Security Council to build capacity peacekeeping mission of the United Nations Mission in the country (UNMISS). This force, with a maximum capacity of 4,000 troops, will enable UNMISS to conduct more patrols along the roads, provide protection for isolated vulnerable populations and provide the security necessary for the provision of security. ‘humanitarian aid. A first company of Rwandan soldiers arrived during the weekend. A Nepalese company and more than 100 Bangladeshi engineers have also arrived in South Sudan. “The arrival of these contingents as well as that of the Rwandan company of Blue Helmets marks the beginning of the progressive deployment of the RPF which will end up counting 4000 soldiers”, declared Mr. Shearer during a joint press conference with the Commander RPF, General Jean Mupenzi, and UNMISS South Sector Commander, General Kindu Tegegn, at Tomping Camp in Juba, the south-Sudanese capital. The other Rwandan peacekeepers in the main battalion are expected to arrive in the coming weeks and the arrival of Ethiopian troops is imminent, the UNMISS chief said. “I would like to reaffirm very clearly that the RPF is not a peacekeeping force distinct from the rest of UNMISS.The 4000 peacekeepers of the RPF will be under the authority of the UNMISS Force Commander, General Frank Kamanzi, “he said.

Uganda (August 11, 2017)

The Ugandan army has completed the withdrawal of its 2,500 soldiers who were chasing Ugandan rebels from the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in the Central African Republic (CAR), an army spokesman said in Kampala. “The LRA has been weakened, we do not expect them to reorganize and rebuild, we have also left CAR and MINUSCA (United Nations Multidimensional Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic). will be able to deal with any new threat from the LRA, “he said. Ugandan troops and their US military advisers ended their six-year pursuit behind Ugandan rebels in the jungles of CAR and the north-east of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), claiming to have accomplished the mission of neutralizing the LRA. Security experts, however, believe that after the Ugandan soldiers have withdrawn, LRA militants could regroup and reorganize themselves to carry out attacks and kidnappings of civilians again.

Somalia (August 15, 2017)

In Somalia, Mukhtar Robow, the former second-in-command of the extremist Shebab movement, surrendered to the Somali authorities who transported him on Monday 14 August in a private plane to Mogadishu. Negotiations were held with government officials, who lasted several hours, at Mukhtar Robow’s home in Ebl, in the Bakool region of southwestern Somalia. His defection is a setback for the shebab movement. Somali special forces provided security for Mukhtar Robow, aka Abu Mansour, when he arrived in the Somali capital. He was accompanied by Defense Minister Abdel Rachid Abdallah Mohamed and Deputy Director of Intelligence Abdelkader Nour James. It is at the presidential palace that he officially declares his position on the shebabs, while making official his rallying to the central power.

G5 Sahel (August 15, 2017)

UN Assistant Secretary-General for Peace Operations El Ghassim Wane called on the Security Council to seize the unique opportunity of setting up the G5 Sahel Joint Task Force (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger) Chad and Mauritania) to meet the challenges of this region of Africa. Through a regional approach, this Joint Task Force can make a significant contribution to the stabilization of the Sahel, in synergy with other initiatives, he said at a meeting of the Council devoted to peace and security in the Sahel. Africa. But to succeed, it will simultaneously address other causes of instability in Mali and throughout the region, he added. Mr. Wane paid tribute to the efforts of the G5 Sahel Joint Force Member States and highlighted the progress made in operationalizing the Force. He noted, however, that various challenges remained: the financing, capabilities and equipment of the Force, but also its articulation with other military structures already present (MINUSMA, Malian armed forces, French operation Barkhane); the rules of engagement and respect for international humanitarian law and human rights, but also the “overall political framework” in which it must evolve, including with regard to the peace and security architecture of the African Union and peace agreements in Mali, which must be “better defined”.

 

2.2 RESOLUTIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Seven reports, five presidential statements and eight resolutions were adopted by the Security Council between May 26 and August 31, 2017.

Somalia: Resolution 2355 of May 26, 2017

It decides to authorize the Member States of the African Union to maintain until 31 August 2017 the deployment of AMISOM, as requested by the African Union, with a maximum of 22,126 personnel. in uniform, and authorizes AMISOM to take all necessary measures to fulfill its mandate as set out in paragraphs 4 to 7 of resolution 2297 (2016). It requests the Secretary-General to continue providing logistical support to the mission.

Libya: Report of the Panel of Experts on Libya S / 2017/466 of June 1, 2017

The Group of Experts, following the political transition in Libya, paid particular attention to the fact that the Libyan Political Agreement, which has not been approved by the Chamber of Deputies, has not been implemented. in its entirety, which undermines the legitimacy of the Government of National Accord appointed by the Council of the Presidency. The two rival prime ministers, Abdallah el-Thinni and Khalifa el-Ghweil, continue to challenge the leadership of the country by President of the Presidential Council Fayez al-Serraj.

RCA: SG Report S / 2017/473 of June 2, 2017

It is established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2301 (2016), by which the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) until 15 November 2017. will find information on major developments in the Central African Republic and on the implementation of MINUSCA’s mandate since February 1, 2017.

Libya: Resolution 2357 of June 12, 2017

It decides to extend the authorizations referred to in resolution 2292 for a further period of twelve months from the date of this resolution (arms embargo).

Somalia: Resolution 2358 of June 14, 2017

It decides to extend the mandate of UNSOM until March 31, 2018. It stresses the importance of UNSOM support for the political process, including through United Nations good offices missions to support the peace process and the UN Security Council. of reconciliation initiated by the Federal Government of Somalia, including strengthening state formation, mediating, preventing and resolving conflicts, revising the Constitution, sharing resources and revenues, to establish the principle of accountability of the Somali institutions, especially in the fight against corruption, to establish an effective federal political system and federal justice, to support the preparation of elections on the principle of “one person, one vote in 2021, which are participatory, credible and transparent, and to coordinate international electoral support for Somalia. It notes the commitment of the Federal Government of Somalia, in accordance with the rule of law, to address without further delay the formalization of the status of the Member States of the Federation, the division of powers, the sharing of resources and revenues, the establishment of a political system and model of federal justice, and also welcomes the willingness of the Federal Government of Somalia and the Member States of the Federation to work closely with each other, as well as with the Assembly on these issues, building on existing work on the revision of the Constitution, and engaging in dialogue with civil society and the Somali public, including the integration of women and youth in this regard .

South Sudan: Secretary General Report S / 2017/505 of June 15, 2017

It is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 2327 (2016), by which the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) until December 15, 2017. It reports on the facts political and security developments during the period from March 2 to June 1, 2017, as well as reforms to adapt the Mission to the situation on the ground, to ensure that it is fulfilled. more effectively its mandate and to enhance the safety and security of United Nations personnel. It will also include a review of the progress made by the parties with regard to the cessation of hostilities, the resumption of dialogue and the establishment of inclusive representation in the Government, as well as recommendations for adjustments to the mandate. UNMISS.

G5 Sahel: Resolution 2359 of June 21st, 2017

It welcomes the deployment of the FC-G5S throughout the participating countries, with military and police personnel of up to 5,000, to restore peace and security. security in the Sahel region. It also welcomes the strategic concept of the CF-G5S operations, communicated to the President of the Security Council by the Secretary-General in his letter dated May 15, 2017, including its provisions relating to the coordination of humanitarian assistance. , the protection of civilians, gender issues and issues of conduct and discipline. It urges the FC-G5S, MINUSMA and the French forces to ensure, through the relevant arrangements, the exchange of information and the proper coordination of their operations, within the limits of their respective mandates, and requests further in this regard, the Secretary-General to strengthen cooperation between MINUSMA and G5 Sahel member States, including through the provision to MINUSMA of useful intelligence and liaison officers from G5 Sahel member States. It recalls the responsibility of the G5 Sahel States to give the CF-G5S the resources it needs, urges the G5 Sahel States to continue their efforts to make the CF-G5S operational in a sustainable, viable and efficient manner. , and welcomes the European Union’s commitment to provide € 50 million in financial support to the CF-G5S, urges bilateral and multilateral partners to provide further support, including through the provision of assistance the logistics, operational and financial capacity of the CF-G5S and also urges them to convene a planning conference early to ensure coordination of donor assistance to the CF-G5S.

DRC: Resolution 2360 of June 21st, 2017

It concerns the sanctions regime which is renewed, the extension of the group of experts and its missions. It condemns the actions of the armed groups, again encourages the Congolese Government to continue to fight against the illegal exploitation and smuggling of natural resources and recalls the mandate of MONUSCO.

DRC: SG Report S / 2017/565 of 30 June 2017

This report reviews major developments in the Democratic Republic of the Congo since March 10, 2017 (S / 2017/206). It describes the progress made in the fulfillment of the mandate of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and provides an overview of developments in the political situation since May 17, 2017 on the implementation of the political agreement of December 31, 2016 (S / 2017/435).

Libya: Resolution 2362 of June 29, 2017

It condemns attempts to smuggle oil, including crude oil and refined petroleum products, from Libya, including through parallel institutions that fall outside the authority of the Government of National Accord. It requests the Government of National Understanding to inform the Committee without delay as soon as it assures the effective control of the National Oil Corporation, the Central Bank of Libya and the Libyan Investment Authority. It reaffirms the travel bans and assets freeze previously set out. It decided to extend the mandate of the Group of Experts until November 15, 2018 and decided that it would remain in charge of the tasks set out in the previous resolution.

Sudan: Resolution 2363 of June 29, 2017

Considering that the situation in the Sudan threatens international peace and security, it decides to extend the mandate of UNAMID until 30 June 2018 and in accordance with those recommendations, that as of the date of adoption of the present resolution and for a period of six months (“first phase”), the maximum authorized UNAMID strength will be reduced to 11,395 military personnel and 2,888 police officers, members of formed police units and police officers, excluding incorporated units. It decides to further reduce the maximum authorized strength of UNAMID military and police personnel as of January 31, 2018, taking into account the recommendations made in the special report (“second phase”), and to reduce this number to 8,735 military personnel, and 2,500 police officers, members of formed police units and non-incorporated police officers by June 30, 2018.

Mali: Resolution 2364 of June 29, 2017

This resolution urges the Government of Mali and the armed groups of Platform and Coordination coalitions to maintain a constructive dialogue, with the firm and sincere political will to accelerate the implementation of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, so that the people of the country can benefit concretely from the benefits of peace, and urgently agree on a new timetable for its implementation. It decides to extend the mandate of MINUSMA until June 30, 2018.

Côte d’Ivoire: Statement by the President of the Security Council S / PRST / 2017/8 of June 30, 2017

At its 7993rd meeting, on 30 June 2017, the Security Council considered the item entitled “The situation in Côte d’Ivoire” and its President made the following statement on his behalf: The mandate of the United Nations Operation in Côte d ‘Ivoire (UNOCI) ending on June 30, 2017, the Security Council commends the remarkable progress made by Côte d’Ivoire since 2004.

RCA: Statement by the President of the Security Council S / PRST / 2017/9, July 13, 2017

The Security Council is concerned that armed groups continue to clash in the Central African Republic and that civilians from certain communities, United Nations peacekeepers and humanitarian personnel continue to be targeted; which continues to destabilize the country, cause numerous civilian casualties and cause significant displacement, even though the parties to the conflict have agreed to put an immediate end to hostilities. The Council deplores all attacks against civilians, violations of human rights and human rights violations, including acts of sexual violence and gender-based violence committed in times of conflict, as well as looting of local authorities. humanitarian organizations, and reaffirms the urgency and imperative of bringing to justice all perpetrators of these violations or abuses, regardless of their status or political affiliation.

Liberia: Statement by the President of the Security Council S / PRST / 2017/11 of July 24, 2017

The Security Council welcomes the overall progress made in restoring peace, security and stability in Liberia, the commitment of the people and Government of Liberia to peace and the establishment of and the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) assistance since its establishment in 2003. He welcomes the peacebuilding plan in Liberia entitled “Sustaining Peace and Ensuring Peace”. by the Secretary-General pursuant to resolution 2333 (2016), following close consultation between the United Nations, the Government of Liberia and the various partners. The Security Council takes note of the peacebuilding plan and the steps to be taken during the first phase, from April 2017 to March 2018, to assist the Government of Liberia in providing the country, before departure from UNMIL, the long-term capabilities needed to sustainably preserve peace; in this regard, he encourages all stakeholders to redouble their efforts to honor their commitments and contribute to the success of this endeavor, and stresses the importance of the Liberian authorities doing more to address the root causes of the conflict, revive reconciliation processes, advance land reform, pursue constitutional and institutional reforms, particularly in the justice and security sectors, promote women’s active participation in peacebuilding, expand the authority of women, State and social services throughout the country and build trust between Liberian citizens and government institutions.

CAR: Mid-Term Review of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic S / 2017/639 of July 26, 2017

More than a year after the election of President Touadéra, little progress has been made to address the root causes of the crisis in the Central African Republic. While several mediations – sometimes competing with each other – have been initiated, the prospect of disarmament remains remote. It is widely believed that the Rome Agreement of June 19, 2017, the fifth signed by armed groups in four years, does not mark the end of the political process, but rather that it constitutes a further step. In this context, while Bangui has remained relatively calm since the demonstrations of 24 October 2016 against the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), most of the national territory is still under the control of armed groups whose activities prevent the restoration of state authority.

DRC: Statement by the President of the Security Council S / PRST / 2017/12, July 26, 2017

The Security Council, having considered the item entitled “The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo” on 26 July 2017, made the following statement on its behalf: “The Security Council expresses its concern over the current political situation, taking into account difficulties encountered in the implementation of the Comprehensive and Inclusive Agreement of December 31, 2016, the deterioration of security conditions, particularly in the Kasai region, as well as the increase in human rights violations. human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law in the country.

South Sudan – Sudan: Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Abyei S / 2017/649 of July 31, 2017

This report reviews the situation in Abyei and the activities of UNISFA, as well as the operations of the Joint Verification and Border Monitoring Mechanism since April 11, 2017.

Burundi: Statement by the President of the Security Council S / PRST / 2017/13 of August 2, 2017

The Security Council remains deeply concerned about the political situation in Burundi, the non-implementation of resolution 2303 (2016) and the lack of commitment of the Government of Burundi in this regard. While noting the generally calm security situation prevailing in the country, it remains alarmed at the growing number of refugees abroad who are disturbed by reports of torture, forced disappearances and extrajudicial executions, as well as the persistence of the political stalemate in the country and the serious humanitarian consequences that flow from it. The Council underlines that the situation in Burundi seriously undermines the significant progress achieved by the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi of August 28, 2000, with devastating consequences for the country and the entire region. He expresses his deep concern at the continuing deterioration of the humanitarian situation, with some 202,000 displaced persons, 3 million people in need and more than 416,000 Burundians seeking refuge in neighboring countries, welcoming the host countries for their efforts and Calls on the governments of the region to respect their international obligations concerning the status of refugees and to ensure that the return decision is voluntary and informed and that the return is safe and dignified.

DRC: Final Report of the Panel of Experts S / 2017/672 / Rev.1 of August 16, 2017

The assassination of two of its members – Michael Sharp, coordinator and specialist on armed groups, and Zaida Catalán, specialist on humanitarian issues, was, for the Group of Experts, the most striking event during his current term . This unprecedented fact, which has not allowed it to conduct all the field activities planned for the preparation of this report, constitutes a deliberate attack on the Security Council. It also testifies, more generally, the worrying security conditions that prevail in the Democratic Republic of Congo: the three provinces of Kasaï have experienced a brutal escalation of violence and other areas still suffer from chronic insecurity. Since its last report, the Panel has seen a decrease in election-related violence across the country despite several instances of interference by armed groups in the voter registration process.

 

2.3 MAIN COMMUNICATIONS FROM THE COMMISSION AND THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL (June 1, 2017 and August 31, 2017)

Eritrea: Press release of the African Union Commission of 9 July 2017

The Chairperson of the AUC announced on 3 July 2017, during the 29th Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union that an AU High Level delegation led by the Commissioner for Peace and Security, Ambassador Smail. Chergui will travel to Asmara, Eritrea to discuss with the authorities of Eritrea the developments in the region, and also exchange views on the AU’s initiative to develop a Horn of Africa Strategy. At the request of the Eritrean authorities and due to a conflicting calendar, new dates will be agreed upon through consultations with the Eritrean government. The Chairperson of the AU Commission reiterates his determination to spare no effort in promoting dialogue, peace and security in the Horn of Africa.

Guinea-Bissau: Communiqué of the Peace and Security Council (699th Meeting) of July 11, 2017

The SPC reiterates its deep concern over the continuing political impasse in Guinea-Bissau and the socio-economic difficulties that the current crisis has brought to the population, as well as the institutional paralysis that has affected the country in the last two years. It also reiterates the continued validity of the Conakry Agreement of October 14, 2016 as the only framework for a peaceful resolution of the crisis in Guinea Bissau. In this regard, the Council welcomes the conclusions of the 51st Ordinary Session of the ECOWAS Conference of Heads of State and Government held in Monrovia on June 4, 2017, which highlighted the need for all stakeholders to comply with the provisions of the Agreement. The Council urges the President of the Republic, José Mário Vaz, to rise to his responsibilities in this situation by showing the way forward in the implementation of the Agreement, in accordance with the latest decisions of the AU and ECOWAS on Guinea Bissau. The Council also urges all parties to refrain from actions or statements that may exacerbate tensions and incite violence and calls for respect for human rights and freedom of expression.

Somalia: Communiqué of the Peace and Security Council (700th Meeting) of July 12, 2017

The SPC endorses the 10-Year Lessons Learned Report of AMISOM, in particular its main conclusion that AMISOM has fulfilled its mandate, including facilitating an environment conducive to two transitions. Somalia. In this regard, the Council recognizes that AMISOM remains an indispensable partner for peace in Somalia, but needs to be judiciously reconfigured to support the next phase of state-building in Somalia during the implementation of the transition plan. He reiterates his gratitude to the United Nations, the EU and other bilateral partners for the support provided to AMISOM operations against Al Shabaab, as well as for their financial and material support to AMISOM and the Federal Government of Somalia . It notes with deep concern that the al-Shabaab terrorist group continues to pose a threat to peace, security and stability in Somalia, as well as to the region and the international community as a whole. It welcomes the conclusions of the joint AU-UN review, in particular the political will expressed by the Federal Government of Somalia to assume the primary responsibility for security, progressively taking over from AMISOM, on the basis of a responsible, viable and realistic transition plan. It decides to renew the mandate of AMISOM for a period of 12 months, until July 31, 2018.

MNJTF: Press Release of the Peace and Security Council (702nd Meeting) of July 19, 2017

The Council welcomed the significant progress made by the FMM and the LCBC Member States plus Benin in the fight against the terrorist group Boko Haram, thus significantly reducing the capacity of Boko Haram, which continues to be dislodged of its strongholds following successive joint operations conducted since June 2016. The Council noted that, despite the successes of the FMM, Boko Haram remains a threat to the countries of the region and retains the capacity to conduct asymmetric attacks, recruit by the force, regroup and strike isolated targeted localities, as well as to carry out suicide attacks. The Council further noted that the Boko Haram group is well known for the recruitment of child soldiers and other forms of forced recruitment. The Council strongly condemned the group’s continued attacks on innocent civilians, the recruitment of vulnerable young people and human rights violations, as well as sexual violence against women and girls, and strongly warned the perpetrators of these abuses and violence that they will account for their actions. The Council acknowledged the demonstrated resource gap currently faced by the MNF in its operations against Boko Haram, including funding and lack of organic air capacity, particularly for offensive operations. In this context, the Council welcomed the contributions made by the AU and partners to strengthen the capacity of the FMM, in accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding and the AU Implementation Agreement, the countries of the Lake Chad Basin and the troop contributors to the FMM. The Council also took note of the progress made in the implementation of the revised Support Implementation Agreement (SIA) and the Memorandum of Understanding between the AU Commission and the troop-contributing countries to the FMM to streamline the AU’s additional support to the FMM, as well as the revised FMM Operations Concept (CONOPs). In this regard, the Council reaffirmed the need for continued consultation and coordination between the AU, partners and the FMM, with regard to procurement and the provision of logistical support to the Mission, which should meet the needs of troops and conditions on the ground. The Council reiterated its call on Member States and partners to continue and intensify their support for the efforts of the LCBC Member States in their fight against the terrorist group Boko Haram. In this regard, the Council expressed its gratitude to the Arab Republic of Egypt for its commitment to offer a thousand training grants to officers and non-commissioned officers of the Sahelo-Saharan region and welcomed his decision to create in Cairo a center for the fight against terrorism.

Mali: Press Release of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU) at its 703rd meeting held on July 20, 2017

The Council once again urged all Malian parties to redouble their efforts to overcome the challenges related to the implementation of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali resulting from the Algiers Process, with a view to to achieve peace and reconciliation in Mali. The Council has taken note with concern of the continuing deterioration of the security situation, not only in northern Mali, but also in the central part of the country. The Council underlined the imperative to reinforce the capacities of the defense and security forces of Mali, both in terms of training and equipment, with a view to better national ownership of the fight against terrorism and transnational organized crime, particularly in northern Mali, and to better contribute, in the future, to regional and international efforts for peace and security. The Council underlined the imperative of a continuous reinforcement of the security cooperation between the countries of the Sahelo-Saharan region in the fight against terrorism and cross-border crime, in particular through the Nouakchott Process, which will have to support at the initiative of G5 Sahel, in the context of the AU Strategy for the Sahel region. In this regard, the Council welcomed the offer of training fellowships made by the Arab Republic of Egypt for the benefit of 1,000 officers and non-commissioned officers from the Sahelo-Saharan region.

Libya: Communiqué of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) at its 703rd meeting held on July 20, 2017

The Council reiterated the AU’s deep concern at the continuing political stalemate, as well as the humanitarian and security situation in Libya, marked by continuing clashes between armed militias, the collapse of the state and divisions between the country’s political leaders. He welcomed the efforts of the Libyan parties to amend by consensus the Libyan Political Agreement (PLA) 2015 to allow for its early implementation, which will create conditions conducive to a comprehensive dialogue for lasting peace and reconciliation in Libya. The Council called for strengthening the AU’s contribution to efforts to find a lasting solution to the crisis in Libya, through the High Representative and the High Level Committee on Libya. He urged the strengthening of unity and coordination of action for Libya among all members of the international community, in particular the Quartet composed of the AU, the LEA, the EU and the United Nations. United Nations, to assist the Libyan parties in their efforts to overcome their differences.

African Standby Force: Communiqué of the Peace and Security Council of July 25, 2017

He welcomed the report of the Chair of the Commission on the FAA, including recommendations on the verification, confirmation and validation objectives of the capabilities pledged by the Regional Forces Pending, as well as updates on the development of training / training, exercises and mission support capabilities, namely: command, control, communication and information systems, the FAA Continental Logistics Base and its relations with regional logistics bases, strategic transport, control of continental / regional movements, the Peace Fund and the AU document on common burdens.

Guinea Bissau: Press release from August 2, 2017

Within the framework of the African Union (AU) Ammunition Safety and Security Management Initiative, launched in 2017, the AU is working with the Government of Guinea Bissau on enhancing ammunition management to reduce the risk of unplanned explosions at munitions sites and prevent theft, loss and diversion.

 

3 POINT OF PEACEKEEPING AND PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

UNITED NATIONS (effective June 30)

MINURSO: United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara

In Western Sahara since April 1991 Workforce deployed: 472 people

MINUSCA: United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic

In the Central African Republic since April 2014. Workforce deployed: 13,633 people

MINUSMA: United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

In Mali since April 2013.

Employees deployed: 14,321 people

MONUSCO: United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo

In the Democratic Republic of Congo since June 2010. Staff deployed: 22,283 people

UNAMID: African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur

In Sudan (Darfur) since July 2007. Staff deployed: 19,685 people

UNISFA: United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei

In Abyei, Sudan since June 2011. Staff deployed: 4,769 people

UNMISS: United Nations Mission in South Sudan

In South Sudan since July 2011. Staff deployed: 15,991 people

UNMIL: United Nations Mission in Liberia

Liberia since September 2003. Staff deployed: 1,622 people

 

3.2 THE AFRICAN UNION

The Regional Cooperation Initiative against the Lord’s Resistance Army (ICR LRA1 – since 2011)

RCA: 85 Men DRC: 500 men

South Sudan: 500 men

The Ugandans announced that this mission had achieved its objectives. Their contingent (like that of the American advisers) should be reduced to the simplest expression.

AMISOM: The African Union Mission in Somalia (since 2007)

Uganda: 6,223 men

Burundi: 5,432 men

Kenya: 3,664 men

Ethiopia: 4,395 men

Djibouti: about 2,000 men2

UNAMID is a UN-AU hybrid operation

We treated it in the UN missions.

The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF – since 2015)

A Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) with 8,700 military, police and civilian personnel to fight Boko Haram. Four countries bordering Lake Chad (Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger) as well as Benin make up this force. The headquarters are in N’Djamena (Chad).

As of August 2015, states had committed to: Nigeria: 3,500 men

Chad: 3,000 men Benin: 750 Niger men: 1,000 men

Cameroon: 2,650 men.

The manpower could be increased to 10,000. The next Conops should allow the MNJTF to deploy 11,500 men.

 

1 Lord’s Resistance Army LRA.

2 www.amisom-au.org (accessed January 03, 2017). Data not updated.

 

4 CONCLUSION

Important milestones await the African continent. At the operational level, we will look at the evolution of the MNJTF and the setting up of the G5 Sahel Joint Force. In terms of relations between the European Union and Africa, the Abidjan summit in late November will be a decisive step.

 

Patrick Ferras

Director of the Horn of Africa Observatory and the African Union Research Center

 

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